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Summary  findings
Kaminsky and Schmukler study whether capital controls  example, controls on outflows in Venezuela during the
affect the link between domestic and foreign stock  1994 crisis, and unremunerated  reserve requirements in
market prices and interest rates. To examine the  Chile and Colombia during a capital-inflow episode,
characteristics of international market integration and  seem to have shielded domestic markets at the most at
the effects of capital controls in the short and long run,  very high frequencies.
they apply band-pass filter techniques to data from six  The degree of financial sophistication does not seem to
emerging economies during the 1990s.  affect Kaminsky and Schmukler's conclusions on the
They find that markets seem to be linked more at  insulation provided by capital controls. True, more
longer horizons. Equity prices seem to be more  developed financial markets, such as those in Brazil, are
connected internationally than interest rates.  more closely linked to international markets than those
They also find little evidence that controls effectively  in Colombia and Venezuela, which are far more illiquid.
segment domestic markets from foreign markets. And  But capital controls do not seem to provide an extra
when they do, the effects seem to be short-lived.  cushion against international  spillovers even in less
Moreover, the effects of controls on outflows do not  developed markets.
seem to differ from those of controls on inflows. For
This paper-a  product of Macroeconomics and Growth, Development Research Group-is  part of a larger effort in the
group to understand the functioning of financial markets and the benefits of financial integration. The study was funded
by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project "Financial Development and Contagion." Copies of this
paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433.  Please contact Emily Khine,
room MC3-347,  telephone 202-473-7471,  fax 202-522-3518,  email address kkhine@worldbank.org.  Policy Research
Working Papers  are also  posted on theWeb at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors maybe contacted atgraciela@gwu.edu
or sschmukler@worldbank.org. August 2001.  (45 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of  work in progress to encourage the exchange of  ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series  is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are  less than fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily  represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CenterShort- and Long-Run Integration
Do Capital Controls Matter?
Graciela Kaminsky




JEL Classification Codes: F02, F21, F32, F36, G15
Keywords:  capital  controls;  restrictions  on  capital movement;  financial integration;  band-pass
filter
We thank Susan Collins, Rick Mishkin, Dani Rodrik, Shang-Jin Wei, and participants  at a conference  held  at the
Brookings  Institution  for very helpful  comments.  We also thank Akiko Terada for superb research  assistance.  The
views expressed  in this paper are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting  those of the World
Bank,  its  Executive  Directors,  or  the  countries  they  represent.  The  World  Bank  Research  Committee  kindly
provided  financial  support  for the paper.  Contact address: The World Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC
20433.  Phone  (202)  458-4167.  Fax:  (202)  522-3518.  Email  addresses:  graciela(a)jwu.edu,
sschmukler(i)worldbank.oreI. Introduction
The recent turmoil in  currency markets in  Asia, Latin America, and Europe and the
explosion of international capital flows that preceded these crises have ignited, once again, the
debate on whether restrictions to  international capital mobility can help reduce the perhaps
excessive euphoria of investors, attenuate the severity of the crises, or limit contagion. Many
have argued that globalization has gone too far, with international capital markets becoming
extremely erratic after liberalization. One of the most ardent defender of the old order has been
Joseph Stiglitz, who as the World Bank's chief economist, clamored for developing countries to
put some limits on capital inflows in order to moderate the "excessive" boom-bust pattern in
financial markets.'  Even controls on capital outflows, not long ago dismissed as ineffective,
have become fashionable again.  Paul Krugman, for instance, has argued that they may help in
managing,  at  least temporarily, an  otherwise disorderly retreat  of  investors. 2 Others have
challenged these views, arguing that financial repression is a  symbol of a bygone  era that
promotes  corrupt and  unstable  financial  systems  and  is  incapable of  preventing  massive
speculative capital attacks against the domestic currency.3
The debate has not been merely theoretical. Some countries have reversed their earlier
liberalization attempts, while others have resisted turning back the clock to the times of capital
controls. Prominent among the first group is Malaysia. In August 1997 -in  the midst of the
Asian crisis and following Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's attacks on "rogue
speculators"-  Malaysia introduced restrictions on capital outflows, which later were severely
reinforced  in  September  1998,  following the  Russian  crisis.  Less  drastic, but  still  quite
restrictive, were  Chile's and  Colombia's restrictions on  capital inflows in  the early  1990s.
Argentina and Peru, by contrast, have refrained from reintroducing capital account controls even
in the presence of severe speculative attacks against their domestic currencies.
But do capital controls, in fact, limit international financial integration and help central
banks regain monetary independence? While the heat of the debate has generated an immense
and still growing empirical literature on the effectiveness of capital controls, the answer is far
1. Joseph Stiglitz, 'Bleak Growth for the Developing World," International Herald Tribune, April 10-11, 1999,  p.
6.
2. Paul Krugman, "Saving  Asia: It's Time to Get Radical," Fortune, September 7, 1998,  pp. 74-80.
3. See, especially, Dornbusch (1998).
1from clear.  Some studies suggest that controls do insulate domestic financial markets; others
conclude that controls are ineffective in stopping the international transmission of shocks. Most
of these studies, however, examine individual country episodes. 4 With each study using a
different methodology and a different country episode, it is difficult to evaluate whether these
conflicting results are evidence that country experiences are in fact  different or simply the
product of different techniques.  Multicountry studies could unravel the causes of this lack of
consensus.  The only impediment is the lack of a comprehensive database on capital controls. 5
Another limitation of previous empirical work is that the research has concentrated on examining
the extent of the co-movement of domestic and foreign returns (of stocks or bonds) at very high
frequencies, be it daily or weekly, ignoring the co-movements at longer horizons.  Thus it has
been impossible to capture evidence on the long-sustained  belief that legal restrictions tend to be
circumvented more  often  the  longer  they  stay  in  place.  Finally, because  of  the  relative
availability of the data, most empirical work has examined the transmission of shocks in equity
6 markets.  However, one of the most appealing aspects of capital controls (at least, in theory) is
that they can allow central banks to maintain an autonomous monetary policy.  7 This was the
goal of Colombia, Chile, and Brazil when they introduced restrictions to capital inflows during
the early 1990s and of Malaysia when it restricted capital outflows after the Russian crisis.  To
examine whether controls did,  in  fact,  insulate emerging markets from  global interest-rate
shocks, more attention should be devoted to co-movements between domestic and world interest
rates.8
Our work complements previous research. First, we  construct a  database on  capital
account restrictions for six emerging markets in the  1990s, which allows us to make cross-
country comparisons on the effects of the controls. Second, to obtain information about the
4. Important exceptions are Montiel and Reinhart (1999), who construct a database on capital account restrictions
for Asian economies during the 1990s.
5.  Some authors have relied  on IMF  measures of  capital account restrictions. These measures, however, are
extremely general and incomplete.
6. The studies on co-movements of domestic and foreign interest rates are mostly limited to industrial countries  with
extensive offshore markets for bank deposits. For these countries, the test of the effects of controls is to compare
returns on domestic bank deposits with similar deposits offered by offshore branches of the same or very similar
banks.
7. Under fixed exchange rates and free capital mobility, central banks lose the ability to choose an independent
monetary policy as money supply is always constrained by the fluctuations in the balance of payments. When
authorities are reluctant to allow the exchange rate to float freely, as in most emerging markets, capital controls
could restore monetary autonomy.
2dynamic aspects of international financial integration, we use the methodologies proposed by
Marianne Baxter and Robert King and Wouter den Haan, which allow us to estimate the co-
movement of domestic and foreign returns at different frequencies. 9 This technique also allows
us  to  determine whether capital controls sever the  international transmission of shocks to
domestic financial markets and  if they do, at what  frequencies. So, for example, we could
examine whether capital controls help to  shield domestic financial markets from transitory
shocks, such as the collapse of the Hong Kong stock market on October 28, 1997, or whether
they  absorb the  shocks of  more protracted phenomena, such as  the persistent increase in
volatility in stock and bond markets in the fall of 1998.  Lastly, we apply these techniques not
only to stock prices but  also to overnight interest rates in order to determine whether central
banks gain monetary independence with the use of capital controls.
The rest  of  the paper  is organized as  follows. In  the next  section, we  review the
theoretical and empirical literature on capital controls with special attention to the evidence of
emerging economies. We then describe the techniques used in the estimation to  capture the
ability of capital controls to  sever international financial links. We present a chronology of
capital account  restrictions in Brazil,  Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, Thailand, and  Venezuela
during the 1990s, and subsequently, in the core of the paper, examine the evolution of the co-
movement of domestic and foreign financial markets in different episodes. In the conclusion, we
summarize our findings and explore avenues for future research.
II. Capital Account Controls: Theory and Evidence
One of the most profound and far-reaching economic developments of the 1990s has
been the explosive growth of international financial transactions. Globalization has been clearly
beneficial to the extent that it has allowed capital to  flow to its  most attractive destination.
However, this same globalization of capital markets has been associated with severe financial
crises.'°  The role of international capital flows in triggering crises has generated once again a
heated debate on the pros and cons of restrictions to capital mobility.
8. For an analysis of the effects of capital controls on monetary autonomy in Chile, see Edwards (1999). For an
analysis of the effects of controls on outflows in Brazil, Malaysia, and Thailand, see Edison and Reinhart (1999).
9. Baxter and King (1994); Den Haan (1996).
10. See, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); and Kaminsky (1998).
3Theory
Under the efficient markets hypothesis, it would be pointless to discuss capital account
controls. Liberalization is  always  perceived as  beneficial to  investors." 1 The rationale  for
restricting international capital flows, by contrast, is grounded in the belief that market failures
and distortions  pervade capital markets around the world. One of the most often cited distortions
is that of information  asymmetries. Information asymmetries are present in goods markets, but it
is in asset markets that they become pronounced. Although a firm producing a good is more
knowledgeable  about the quality of the product than is the buyer, it is not so difficult for a buyer
to  monitor the  quality of,  say,  the  computer  chips  produced in  Taiwan  or  in  Thailand.
Asymmetric information is, by contrast, at the core of the existence of different agents in capital
markets. Banks, for example, exist because of their superior knowledge about the value of the
firms to which they lend. Problems of asymmetric information  are more rampant in international
capital markets, where geographical and cultural differences make harder the task of obtaining
information. Moreover, imperfections in international markets are magnified by the difficulties
in enforcing contracts across borders.) 2
In this environment, investors may overreact to  shocks, withdrawing en  masse  from
countries at the first signs of economic problems, or they may become euphoric and pour on
capital in quantities beyond those justified  by "good" fundamentals. This is the message of
several theoretical  papers emphasizing  private or imperfect information. 13
This  is why Krugman, for example, has  argued that emergency controls on capital
outflows may be a good choice at times of severe speculative attacks from domestic and foreign
speculators.) 4 However, we could rebut, paraphrasing Leonardo Bartolini and Allen Drazen,1 5
that a ban on the convertibility of domestic currency, which is intended to curtail outflows may,
in fact, provoke an stampede out of the country because it reduces investors' confidence.
11. Even with efficient capital markets, capital account liberalization may not be  optimal in the  presence of
significant barriers to trade. Trade restrictions may lead to misallocation of international capital and even lead to a
decline in welfare of the capital-importing country. See, for example, Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro  (1977).
12. For an excellent discussion on the effects of asymmetric information in assets markets, see Eichengreen and
Mussa (1998).
13. See, for example, Calvo and Mendoza (1999); Calvo (1999); Kodres and Pritsker (1998); and Aghion, Bachetta,
and van Wincoop  (1998).
14. Krugman, "Saving Asia."
15. Bartolini  and Drazen (1994).
4Although it is often argued that controls on capital outflows are also likely to reduce
capital inflows, many of those who oppose restrictions on outflows favor controls on inflows
emphasizing the "precautionary" role of these controls, in contrast to the destabilizing effect of
controls on outflows. The list of those supporting restrictions on capital inflows has grown larger
in the last decade, with the most ardent supporters  including Stiglitz and Barry Eichengreen  *16
Evidence from  Emerging Markets
A substantial amount of empirical research has documented the effectiveness  of different
capital account restrictions in single episodes for individual countries. One of the countries that
has received particular attention is Chile, perhaps because it systematically imposed limits on
capital flows during the two episodes of international  capital inflows to emerging markets: 1978-
81 and 1990-96.17 Overall, the evidence from these studies suggests that the controls on inflows
severed the links between domestic and foreign returns and allowed Chile's central bank to
undertake an independent monetary policy.  Interestingly, this finding only holds when external
shocks were small. Controls were not effective in preventing the contagion effects of very large
shocks, such as those observed in the midst of the Asian crisis in 1997. Other countries that have
attracted a great deal of attention are Colombia and Brazil.' 8 The conclusions are mixed.  While
Sebastian Edwards and Mohsin Khan for Colombia,' 9 and Eliana Cardoso and Ilan Goldfajn for
Brazil, 20 find that  capital account restrictions have some impact on  domestic interest rates,
Marcio Garcia and  Marcus Valpassos find that controls were ineffective for Brazil. 21 The
experience with capital account controls in Asia has also attracted some attention. For example,
Menzie Chinn and Jeffrey Frankel examine the behavior of covered differentials for a group of
developing countries in Asia and find that although these markets were not as integrated as those
in industrial countries, covered differentials seem to have narrowed during the 1  980s even in the
presence of restrictions to capital mobility. 22 Helmut Reisen and Helene Yeches use curb
16. See Stiglitz, "Bleak Growth"; and Eichengreen (1999)
17. See, for example, Budnevich and Lefort (1997); Cowan and De Gregorio (1997); De Gregorio, Edwards, and
Valdes (1998); Edwards (1999); and Soto (1997) are among these studies.
18. See, for example, Edwards and Khan (1985); Garcia and Valpassos  (1998); and Cardoso and Goldfajn  (1998).
19. Edwards and Khan (1985).
20. Cardoso and Goldfajn  (1998).
21. Garcia and Valpassos  (1998).
22. Chinn and Frankel (1994).
5market rates to examine the degree of monetary independence in South Korea and Taiwan and
find that capital mobility remained roughly constant in the  1980s in the presence of  capital
controls. 23 These studies, however, are mostly concerned with the degree of capital mobility
during episodes of financial controls and do not compare these estimates with those during
periods of financial liberalization.
Single country studies far exceed multicountry studies. Most of the multicountry studies
use  the  information in  the  International  Monetary  Fund's  Annual  Report  on  Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, in particular the index of capital account liberalization
constructed by Alberto Alesina, Vittorio Grilli, and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferreti. 24 This indicator
takes two values: one when capital controls are in place and zero otherwise. The indicator does
not distinguish whether there are controls on capital inflows or outflows or both, nor does it
quantify the severity of the controls. Very few studies thus far have attempted to create a new
database on capital account restrictions that tries to  capture the intensity and origin of the
restrictions. Noteworthy is the 1999 study by Peter Montiel and Carmen Reinhart, who construct
a database for capital account restrictions of fifteen emerging economies during the 1990s to
study the effects of restrictions on capital inflows. 25 They find that controls appear to alter the
composition of capital flows in the direction usually intended by these measures, reducing the
share of short-term and portfolio flows while increasing that of foreign direct investment.
III. Measuring Correlations  at Different Frequencies.26
Legal controls on capital mobility are not always translated into actual restrictions on
international capital flows.  In country after country, the private sector has found ways of getting
around controls. The simplest mechanisms are the overinvoicing  of imports, the underinvoicing
of exports, and the mislabeling of the nature of the capital movements. There is also a belief that
the longer the controls are in place, the less effective they become. Even if capital controls are as
effective in insulating domestic financial markets over the long run as they are in the short run, it
may  be  that  long-  and  short-run  co-movements nonetheless differ because  central banks
23. Reisen and Yeches  (1993).
24. Alesina,  Grilli,  and Milesi-Ferreti  (1994).
25. Montiel  and Reinhart  (1999).
6introduce restrictions targeting only "hot money" flows. Under both scenarios, co-movements  in
the short run will be smaller than those in the long run. To untangle the short- and long-run co-
movements, we apply band-pass filters to stock prices and interest rates. In contrast, previous
researchers might have missed the correlation of domestic and foreign returns in the medium and
long run, because they applied a first-difference filter to the data, and this  filter weights the
highest frequencies relatively heavily, with little weight on low  and medium frequencies. 27
Below, we explain the characteristics  of the band-pass filter.
From the Wold theorem, we know that any covariance stationary series has a frequency-
domain representation. That is, any covariance stationary variable xt can be represented as a
weighted sum of periodic functions of the form cos(cot)  and sin(&it),  where co  denotes a particular
frequency. The frequency domain representation  is given by
Xl =A1+fa(  )cos(ax)dz+  wf  ())sin(o)d,  (1)
with  (.) and  (.) being random processes.
Baxter and King show how to construct filters that isolate specific frequency bands, while
removing stochastic and deterministic trends. 28 Suppose one wants to  isolate that part of a
stochastic variable x, that is associated with frequencies between o1 and ()2 with 0 < (c1  <  C02  <
There are two types of possible filters: the high-pass filter and the band-pass filter. In the first
case, (<2  =  ,  and all frequencies higher than w, are included. In the second case, (i)2  <  ,  and all
frequencies higher than w, but lower than W2 are included. The filters are two-sided symmetric
linear filters and can be expressed as follows:
xF  =  B(L)x,,  (2)
where x[F  is the filtered series, L is the lag operator, and
t~~~~~~~
B(L)  =  bh Lh, with b  =  b-h*  (3)
h=--
There is  a  unique relationship between the  spectrum of  the  filtered series and the
spectrum of the original series that allows us to obtain the values of the coefficients bh. This can
be shown as follows:
26. The discussion in this section closely follows the discussion in Baxter and King (1994); and Den Haan
(1996).
27. See Baxter (1994) for a more precise discussion of the characteristics  of various filters.
7Let the Wold representation for xt be given by
x, = C(L)er;  (4)
thus,
xF = B(L)C(L)e, . (5)
Then, the spectrum of the filtered series can be written as
S F (w)  =  B(ei) 2 SxW,  (6)
where IB(e-' I is the gain of the filter B(L). As shown in the previous equation, the spectrum of
the filtered series xF has to be equal to S, if  |  E  [o,,  o2  ]  and equal to zero outside  this interval.
Thus IB(e-'w)  has to be equal to one  if  |  E  [E  ,, w2 ] and zero, otherwise. It can be shown that
the |B(e-'-  )that  satisfies these conditions implies
bo =  t2  'I,  and  (7)
71
b  - sin(o.j 2h)-sin(o.lh)  h  (8)
h  )z,h,h  1,.()
The ideal filter is  an  infinite moving average and cannot be  applied in practice. In
practice one has to truncate B(L). This gives an approximate filter A(L), where
K
A(L) =  XahL,  (9)
h=-K
and K is the truncation parameter. Of course a higher value of K means a more accurate band
pass filter but also the loss of more data points. The ideal filter B(L) has the property that B(1) =
0. To ensure the same property for the feasible filter A(L),  we follow den Haan and adjust the
coefficients of A(L) in such a way that they add up to zero as well. Let 6 be equal to
(2K+l)_  Xbh.  (10)
h=-K
As in den Haan, 29 we adjust the coefficients as follows:
ah  = bh+ 6.  (1 1)
Note that the distortion introduced by this restriction goes to zero if K goes to infinity.
28. Baxter and King (1999).
29. Den Haan (1996, p. 7).
8So far, we have examined the case of stationary  processes. Den Haan also shows that the
properties of the filters for stationary series remain valid when we have integrated stochastic
processes.
Section 5 reports the correlations of the filtered series at different frequencies. \ In our
estimations, we are going to use the fluctuations of stock prices and interest rates at different
bands to estimate short-, medium-, and long-run correlations.
IV. Capital Account Restrictions:  A Chronology3 0
This section describes the chronology of capital account controls for six country cases:
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Venezuela.  We focus our analysis on the
developments  of the 1990s,  since daily data on stock prices and overnight interest rates start only
approximately in 1990.
Brazil
In the late 1980s,  Brazil embarked on a liberalization  plan, relaxing restrictions on capital
inflows and outflows. The first liberalization steps were implemented in  1987, when foreign
investors were granted limited tax exemptions on dividends and capital gains. In June 1990 the
government announced a gradual liberalization of remittances abroad of dividends, profits, and
capital. Liberalization was  further reinforced in  1992 by  exempting foreign investors from
taxation on  capital  gains and  dividends. Foreign  investors were  allowed to  participate in
derivative markets, and domestic firms were allowed to  issue American depository receipts
(ADRs). The liberalization process was strengthened by a reduction in the required minimum
length  of  stay  (from  twelve  years  to  six)  for  foreign capital invested  in  Brazil  through
privatization auctions.
Capital  account  liberalization  was  interrupted  when  restrictions  on  inflows  were
introduced beginning in June 1993.  The goal of the central bank was to reduce inflows of the
"hot  money"  type  that  had  increased  dramatically in  the  aftermath  of  the  Brady  Plan
30. This  section draws from Ariyoshi and  others (1999); Edwards (1999); Garcia and  Valpassos (1998); and
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2000).
9restructuring agreement (announced in July 1992).31  In June 1993  the central bank increased the
minimum amortization term of  financial loans from thirty to thirty-six months and allowed
foreign investors to apply for tax exemptions on dividends and capital gains only if repatriations
occurred after ninety-six months (previously the minimum maturity was sixty months).  Trade
credits also began to be regulated, with a maximum allowance of 180 days (from 360 days)
between inflows from export credits and the shipment of the merchandise.  Domestic banks'
dollar-denominated liabilities (as a share of net worth) were also restricted.  In August 1993
restrictions were further reinforced.  Institutional foreign investors were not allowed to purchase
fixed income securities or shares in commodity investment funds.  But investors circumvented
this prohibition by  trading in  debentures, which replicated the investment in  fixed income
securities.  To  close this  loophole, in November the National Monetary Council prohibited
investment in debentures (only those already purchased with maturities longer than five years
could be kept until maturity).  In addition, a tax of 5 percent was levied on exchange rate
transactions.  With derivative markets in Brazil quite developed, investors used derivatives to
create securities with  fixed  yields.  Again,  in  December, the  central bank  supported new
legislation to prohibit derivative contracts from replicating fixed income securities.  In January
1994 restrictions were further reinforced and the entrance tax on investments in fixed income
funds was extended to  all  portfolio investments.  On June 30,  1994, the eve of the  Real
Stabilization Plan, several additional restrictions were implemented.  Most of the restrictions
were imposed on export credits, which were seen as a  channel to circumvent restrictions on
capital inflows.
When the Mexican crisis rumbled across Latin America during the first quarter of 1995
and  capital inflows became outflows, the  monetary authorities relaxed controls on  capital
inflows. For example, in March, the minimum maturity for new foreign loans was reduced from
thirty-six to twenty-four months while the minimum period for the renewal or extension of
foreign loans was reduced from thirty-six to six months; in April the entrance tax was abolished.
But the reversal in capital flows turned out to be only a temporary phenomenon.  With capital
inflows surging again in the summer of 1995, the monetary authorities started to enforce tighter
restrictions on capital inflows. The entrance tax was reintroduced in August and the rate set at 5
31. In July 1992 Brazil reached agreement on the restructuring of the interest payments on its foreign debt. The
agreement  was signed in November 1993.
10percent.  In September 1995 foreigners' access to fixed income investments, fixed income-linked
strategies, and  derivative markets in  Brazil was completely eliminated.  In February 1996
complementary restrictions were introduced to try to lengthen the minimum maturities for all
currency loans to three years, and a 5 percent entrance tax was applied to inflows resulting from
privatizations.  Once again, the reversals in capital flows following the Asian crisis triggered a
relaxation in the controls on capital inflows in 1997.  During that year, the minimum maturity on
foreign loans was reduced from three years to one year for new loans and to six months for
renewals or extensions, and in April the entrance tax was reduced to 2 percent.
Again the crisis of 1999 prompted the monetary authorities to tighten the controls on
international capital flows.  This time, however, restrictions were imposed on capital outflows.
On  March  1 the  government ordered local  investment funds to  increase their  holdings of
government bonds and raised to 80 percent (from 60 percent) the minimum amount of Brazilian
sovereign debt that had to be held by domestic funds, reducing the share that could be held in
other countries' debt.
Chile
Chile introduced restrictions on capital inflows in  June 1991.  Initially, all portfolio
inflows were subject to a 20 percent reserve deposit that earned no interest.  For maturities of
less than a year, the deposit applied for the duration of the inflow, while for longer maturities, the
reserve requirement was for one year. In July 1992 the reserve requirement on portfolio inflows
was raised to 30 percent, and the holding period was set at one year, independent of the flow's
length of stay.  During that same month, reserve requirements  were extended to trade credits and
loans related to  direct foreign investment.  In  1995 capital controls were extended to cover
Chilean stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange and to international issues of bond.
With markets in turmoil and the Chilean peso under attack, in June 1998  the reserve requirement
was lowered to 10 percent, and in September of that year reserve requirements  were eliminated.
Chile has also regulated foreign direct investment.  Foreign direct investment was subject to a
three-year minimum stay in the country until 1992,when the minimum stay was reduced to one
year.
11Colombia
During the early 1990s Colombia underwent a dramatic process of liberalization.  In
December 1990, the Congress passed a law allowing the executive branch to implement a wide-
ranging reform package that included the liberalization of the capital account and the reduction
of tariff rates. In January 1991 a new foreign investment  code was approved, granting foreigners
the same rights, such as equal access to local credit as well as export incentives, as domestic
investors.  From that point forward, foreigners could have 100 percent ownership of domestic
financial institutions.  The liberalization of the capital account, however, was not long-lasting.
As early as July 1992, a 10 percent withholding tax on transfers and nonfinancial private services
was introduced to reduce the use of certain current account transactions for speculative purposes.
Capital controls in the form of unremunerated reserve requirements on external borrowing were
introduced in September 1993.  Initially the unremunerated reserve requirement was limited to
loans with maturities up to eighteen months and the reserve requirement was set at 47 percent.
In 1994 the maturity of the loans for which the unremunerated  reserve deposit was required was
extended to five years.  In the following years, the reserve requirements were changed several
times to better target shorter-term inflows, and the tax was rate was modified as well. Following
the crisis in Asia, the restrictions were substantially reduced to contain the speculative attacks
against the Colombian peso. For example, in January 1998,  foreign loan nonremunerated deposit
requirements were reduced to 25 percent of the loan and the minimum maturity of such loans
was shortened  to twelve months.  In September the reserve requirements  were further reduced to
10 percent, and the minimum maturity of foreign loans was shortened to six months.
Malaysia
Malaysia underwent a  process of  liberalization of  the  capital account  in  1986-87.
Portfolio inflows and outflows were freed. Cross-border activities in ringgit were also treated
liberally, including the use  of ringgit in trade, financial transactions with nonresidents, and
offshore trading in securities listed on local exchanges.  As a result, an active offshore ringgit
market developed.  Until  1997 local banks  could provide forward cover against ringgit to
nonresidents,  facilitating arbitrage between domestic and offshore  markets.
12This liberal regime was partly abandoned  in 1994. Starting on January 17, banks became
subject to a ceiling on their nontrade- or noninvestment-related  external liabilities.  On January
24 the Malaysian central bank approved a resolution that prohibited residents from selling short-
term  monetary instruments to  nonresidents.  Restrictions were  tightened in  February, with
commercial banks required to place the ringgit funds of foreign banking institutions with the
central bank.  Banks were prohibited from undertaking nontrade-related swap and outright
forward transactions.
On August 1994 these restrictions were eliminated and the capital account was fully
liberalized.  Portfolio inflows were freed of restrictions, as were portfolio outflows except for
resident corporations borrowing domestically.  Banks were allowed to borrow offshore without
restriction, although their  net open positions were  monitored closely and residents' foreign
currency  borrowing was subject to limits.
Following the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997, the ringgit came under attack. To
alleviate the speculative pressures, the monetary authorities temporarily imposed restrictions on
ringgit nontrade-related swap transactions with nonresidents  in August 1997. At the peak of the
Asian crisis, on September 1, 1998, controls were severely tightened. A wide range of exchange
and  capital controls were introduced.  Many of the  measures implemented were  aimed at
eliminating the  offshore ringgit market  and restricting the  supply of ringgit to  speculators
seeking to short the currency. Malaysian banks were prohibited from conducting transactions in
offer-side swaps with nonresident banks and from engaging in reverse repurchase transactions
collateralized by ringgit instruments with nonresident banks. All ringgit holdings held offshore
were ordered to  be  repatriated.  Other restrictions were  aimed at preventing heavy capital
outflows by residents and nonresidents, such as a twelve-month holding period was introduced
for repatriation of portfolio capital.  Finally, prior approval was required for all residents to
invest abroad in any form.  Restrictions were relaxed somewhat on February 15, 1999, when a
graduated system of exit levies on repatriation of the principal of capital investments  replaced the
twelve-month  holding period requirement for repatriation of portfolio capital.
13Thailand
Thailand's capital account was quite liberalized in the early 1990s.  Although portfolio
inflows were unrestricted, portfolio and foreign direct outflows were limited. With the exception
of net open position limits, banks foreign borrowing was also unrestricted; residents were free to
borrow offshore, although proceeds were required to be repatriated to authorized banks or placed
in foreign currency accounts.  Inflows to Thailand surged during the 1990s, most of them short
term (accounting  for about 60 percent of the total in 1993), and concentrated in banks borrowing
through the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF).  In August 1995 the authorities
started to introduced restrictions on capital inflows.  The measures included a 7 percent reserve
requirement (held at the central bank) on nonresident baht accounts with less than one-year
maturity and on finance companies' short-term foreign borrowing. Also reporting requirements
were imposed for short foreign currency positions. Further tightening of the restrictions occurred
from April to June 1996,  when the 7 percent reserve requirement  was extended to new short-term
offshore borrowing with maturity of less than one year by commercial banks and BIBF banks.
As a prudential measure, the minimum capital adequacy requirement for commercial  banks was
also raised.  Toward the end of 1996, all restrictions on foreign borrowing were eliminated.
With the reversal in capital flows to Thailand, concerns about outflows started to flare.
Following the speculative attacks against the baht in the beginning of May 1997, on May 15 the
monetary  authorities  imposed  somewhat  severe  capital  controls  to  stabilize  the  baht.
Nonresidents were required to use the onshore exchange rate to convert baht proceeds from sales
of stocks.  Financial institutions were asked to refrain from transactions with nonresidents, such
as baht lending through swaps and sales of baht against foreign currencies, that could facilitate a
build-up of baht positions in the offshore market.  Later (in June), all such transactions were
suspended. In July the central bank introduced a two-tier exchange rate system.  Restrictions
were eliminated on January 30, 1998.
Venezuela
In 1989 Venezuela began a sweeping financial liberalization, both domestic and external.
Ceilings on interest rates were removed (as were controls on credit), the system of multiple
14exchange rates was abolished, and virtually all forms of exchange controls were eliminated. The
liberalization did not last long, however. In the midst of its banking crisis, Venezuela reimposed
drastic controls on capital outflows to stop the severe speculative attacks against the bolivar. On
June 27,  1994, the foreign exchange market was closed and outright prohibitions on capital
outflows (excluding flows related to the amortization of external debt and the repatriation of
capital by foreigners) were introduced.  The controls also restricted the availability of foreign
exchange for import payments and  established surrender requirements on foreign exchange
receipts from exports of goods and services.  Surrender requirements were also imposed on
capital inflows. Although the controls were not  abolished until April 22,  1996, a  de  facto
currency  convertibility for  the  repatriation  of  capital  and  income  was  created  when  the
government allowed Brady bond trading to resume on June 22, 1995.
V. What Do Capital Controls  Really Do?
We now turn to the effects of capital controls in the six country cases described in the
previous section and ask whether capital controls reduce financial instability or insulate domestic
financial markets from international shocks.  We focus our analysis on the behavior of stock
prices and interest rates in the domestic economy and compare it to that of other economies in
the same region.  Since we are interested in isolating fluctuations in the short-, medium-, and
long-run, we examine daily data.  Most of our stock index data begin in 1990; data for overnight
interest rates generally begin in the mid-1990s.  First we isolate the fluctuations of stock prices
and interest rates at different frequencies and report their movements at different bands. Then we
estimate the  correlations between domestic and  foreign returns during  episodes  of  capital
controls and liberalization.
Data
The stock prices used in our estimations are the general stock indexes of each country in
U.S. dollars. Interest rates are  overnight interest rates adjusted for expected exchange rate
changes between the domestic currency and the U.S. dollar. Since forward exchange markets are
not well developed for most of the countries in the sample, all domestic interest rates are
15converted into expected returns in dollars under the assumption of perfect foresight-that  is,
realized future spot rates are used  as proxy for expected future exchange rates.  With the
exception of the overnight interest rate for Chile, which was obtained from the Central Bank of
Chile database, all data were obtained from Bloomberg.
Figures 1-4 report stock price indexes and interest rates for the six countries for which
we investigate the effects of  capital controls, plus  eight other countries in Asia and  Latin
America.  These figures underscore the mostly synchronized rallies and downturns of stock
markets in Latin America and Asia over the longer run (five-year cycles), with rallies in the early
1  990s followed by downturns since 1997. Note also the sharp increase in volatility of overnight
interest rates starting in 1997 with the Asian crisis.  The data for these fourteen countries are
used to construct  two regional indexes. We then examine the co-movements of financial markets
of each of our six country cases with the index of the region.
Financial Cycles
To obtain a higher resolution picture of the co-movement of financial markets in the two
regions, we first examine the fluctuations of each stock index and the corresponding regional
index for the filtered series.  We then look at the behavior of the filtered interest rates (adjusted
for expected exchange rate changes), in the domestic economy and in the region. In both cases,
we compare the amplitude of short- and medium-run fluctuations in the domestic and regional
indexes during episodes of capital controls and liberalization.
We construct two regional indexes.  The regional index for Asia includes the stock
indexes or interest rates of Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea,
Taiwan (for the stock market index and Singapore for the regional index of interest rates), and
Thailand. The index for Latin America includes the stock indexes or interest rates of Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. To  eliminate spurious co-movement
between the financial market of a country and the regional index we exclude the data of the
country analyzed from the regional index-that  is, when we examine Brazil, we exclude Brazil
from the Latin American index.  Each country has equal weight in the regional index.  Note,
however, that when we construct the regional stock market indexes, we first standardize the
indexes of all the countries to series with zero mean and unit variance. We standardize  the series
16for the index so as not to replicate the oscillations of the country index with more volatility. We
use these standardized  stock market indexes to estimate the correlations  in the next section.
No one would argue against examining the cyclical behavior of interest rates.  Still, many
have argued against the estimation of cycles in stock markets because if markets are efficient,
stock prices should follow random walk.  But the hypothesis of efficient markets has not been
undisputed.  In recent years, an increasing number of observers have supported the view that
stock markets, far from being efficient, exhibit boom-bust cycles triggered by investors (rational
or irrational) herding behavior. 32 More specifically for emerging markets, we, together with
Richard Lyons report variance-ratio tests for stock prices, rejecting the null hypothesis that stock
prices follow a random walk. 33 In view of this evidence, we now also discuss the cyclical
behavior of stock prices.
Figures 5-10 display the stock market cycles at two frequencies: 18- to 30-day band and
88- to 100-day band. Figures 11-15 report similar evidence for interest rates. The top panel in
each figure shows the cycles at the 18- to 30-day band and the middle panel shows the cycles at
the 88- to 100-day band.  In both panels, the solid line reflects the fluctuations of the individual
country index, and the dotted line reflects the fluctuations of the regional index. The amplitude
of the fluctuations in the domestic financial market is measured in the left axis, while that for the
regional index is measured in the right axis. The vertical lines in both panels divide the episodes
of  controls on the capital account from the episodes of no controls on the capital account.
Although it will not be at the center of our analysis, these figures also provide information on the
magnitude of the financial cycles. This information is reported in the bottom panels. First, we
show the average amplitude of the booms and crashes in the domestic and regional indexes at the
two  frequencies,  both  in  times  of  capital  controls  and  in  episodes  of  capital  account
liberalization. 34 Second, we report the ratio of the amplitude of the cycles in the domestic
economy relative to that of the regional index to examine whether capital controls stabilize or
amplify financial cycles in the domestic economy relative to that in the region.
Two interesting facts emerge from figures 5-10. First, there is a large degree of positive
association between the country index and the regional index. This association seems higher in
32. See, for example, Calvo (1999); Calvo and Mendoza (1999); Kodres and Pristker (1998).
33. Kaminsky, Lyons,  and Schmukler (1999).
34. The amplitude of the booms (crashes) is the difference from the peak (trough) to the mean of the cycle that by
construction is zeio.
17the longer run (lower frequencies).  As expected, the amplitude of the cycles has a pronounced
time-varying  pattern, increasing substantially  in the spring of 1998 for the Latin American stocks
and  in  1997 for  the Asian  indexes.  Interestingly, some  stock  markets seem to  move in
synchronization with the regional index while others seem to move independently.  In Latin
America, Brazil and Chile seem to be in the first group; Colombia and Venezuela, by contrast,
seem to be more exposed to idiosyncratic shocks. Finally, the fluctuations in the stock market in
both Malaysia and Thailand seemed to be highly correlated with the movements in other markets
in that region.
Second, the amplitude of the short-run cycles in the domestic economy (relative to that of
the regional index) in  episodes of  controls and liberalization does not  show any particular
pattern.  In contrast, the amplitude of longer-run domestic cycles far exceeds that of the region
during episodes of free mobility of capital, but it is remarkably smaller in episodes of capital
controls. 35 For example, the amplitude of the 100-day cycles in Brazil during the liberalization
episode is about 50 percent higher than that of the 100-day cycles in the region.  In contrast,
during the capital controls episode, the amplitude of the 100-day domestic booms (crashes) is
about 20 (65) percent smaller than the amplitude of the 100-day regional booms (crashes). This
evidence seems to support the claim that globalization triggers excessive booms and busts in
financial  markets,  as  argued  by  Calvo  and  Mendoza.  Their  explanation  suggests  that
globalization triggers permanent increases in herding behavior and the size financial cycles. 36
Our evidence, which spans only the 1990s, reflects the behavior of stock prices in the immediate
aftermath of  liberalization and  may be  only evidence of  a  transitory phenomenon. 37 This
indicates that we might need to search for different explanations, such as the one proposed by
Bacchetta and  van  Wincoop (1998),  who  argue that  the  incomplete information problem
35. Since we are using daily data we could not control for the possible changing volatility of market fundamentals in
the  domestic economy and  in the  region. Traditional data on fundamentals are published at  most  at monthly
frequencies. Future  work  should  address  this  problem. One  possibility  would  be  to  control  for  changing
fundamentals  using data on daily economic and political news (from financial newspapers).
36. Calvo and Mendoza (2000) argue that free intemational capital mobility, by increasing the menu of assets
available to investors, promotes diversification. But diversification in a world with costly acquisition of country-
specific  information reduces the  return  in  acquiring information about  specific  assets, aggravates imperfect
information,  promotes herding behavior, and triggers pronounced booms and crashes in financial markets.
37. Kaminsky and Schmukler (2000), using a  sample of twenty-eight countries for the period 1975-99, provide
further evidence that the magnifying effects of liberalization on financial cycles are indeed merely transitory, with
cycles becoming less pronounced than those in episodes of capital controls if the liberalization attempt persists for
several years.
18triggered by liberalization is  a transitory phenomenon, which is overcome as learning takes
place. 38
Turning  now  to  the  evidence  from  interest  rates,  figures  11-15  show  that  the
synchronization of Latin American regional money markets is far smaller than that observed in
equity markets; market jitters in Brazil in 1998-99 are not transmitted to Chile or Colombia, and
the volatility in Colombia in the midst of its currency crises in 1998-99 does not seem to have
affected Latin American money markets. Money markets in Asia, by contrast, seem to be highly
integrated, with  external shocks being  transmitted quite  rapidly to  the  domestic market. 39
Interestingly, in several countries, such as Chile and Colombia, capital controls do not seem to
have attenuated the volatility of the monetary instruments (relative to that of the regional index),
with the relative amplitude of the fluctuations of domestic interest rates being at least 20 percent
higher during periods of capital controls.
Effects  of Controls: Short-Lived  or Long-Lasting?
In the previous section, we gave a flavor of the results we can obtain when we isolate the
fluctuations in stock prices and interest rates at two specific frequencies. Those results, however,
do not address whether controls on capital flows help to insulate the economy from contagion
stemming from shocks in other emerging markets. To answer this question, we need to estimate
the correlations of the domestic and the regional variables.  Figures 16-17 report the correlation
coefficients of the filtered series of stock prices and interest rates of the six country cases and the
regional indexes using the band-pass filter. The correlations  measure co-movements  in the short
run (8- to 20-day fluctuations) and in the longer run (up to a maximum of 108- to  120-day
fluctuations). We examine the behavior of the co-movement during episodes controls on inflows
(Chile and Colombia), during episodes of controls on outflows (Venezuela),  and during episodes
38. Another explanation supporting the evidence that capital account liberalization temporarily triggers financial
instability is discussed by Edwards (1999) and Dornbusch (1998).  These authors claim that controls give a false
sense of  security, encouraging irresponsible behavior of policymakers and triggering risky behavior by banks.
Liberalization in this scenario unveils a time bomb ready to explode as nearly bankrupt  domestic banks suddenly get
access to new sources of funding, triggering pronounced financial booms and crashes. But this phenomenon is just
temporary as free capital markets start to fill the important supervisory function over financial institutions.
39. These results are robust to different specifications for the  expected exchange rate changes.  Although not
reported, we also estimated future exchange rates using lagged exchange rate changes and lagged domestic and
foreign interest rates.
19of  controls on  inflows and  outflows  (Brazil, Malaysia, and  Thailand) relative to  the  co-
movements when the controls were removed. Tables 1 and 2 report the correlation coefficients,
their standard errors and a test of equality of the correlation coefficient during periods of capital
controls and liberalization. Because the autocorrelation, standard errors are calculated using the
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent variance (VARHC) estimator from den Haan
and Andrew Levin. 40
Interestingly, overall stock indexes in different countries seem to have more of a life of
their  own at high  frequencies but  seem to  be  more coordinated at lower  frequencies. For
example, the co-movements at frequencies between 18-30 days oscillate around 0.40, whereas
co-movements at  lower  frequencies increase  up  to  0.70.  Although not  reported, the  co-
movements between a country index and the indexes of countries in other regions are far smaller
than the within-region correlations. This evidence agrees with already documented evidence that
contagion is (or at least has been) of a regional nature. 41 The exception is the Chilean stock
market, which during the late 1990s  was strongly influenced by the developments in Asia.42
Overall, our results for the stock market suggest that if capital controls create a barrier
between fluctuations in the region and fluctuations in the domestic stock market, this barrier is,
at most, present at high frequencies. So, for example,  restrictions in Brazil seem to have reduced
the co-movements of its stock index with the Latin America index for periodicities of up to
twenty days, but this effect disappears for longer cycles.  We obtain similar evidence for the
episode of controls in Malaysia.  Capital controls do not seem to have insulated the Thai stock
market even in the short run.  Finally, although the Chilean experience with capital controls was
advertised as the most successful in preventing contagion, these controls did not manage to
segment stock prices in Chile from regional fluctuations.
This evidence agrees with the chronologies of capital controls described in the previous
section.  For example, the chronicle of the controls on inflows in Chile is a story of investors
finding loopholes and the authorities introducing more restrictions to close those  loopholes.
Chile introduced  restrictions on capital inflows in June 1991.  As noted by Edwards,
40. Den Haan and Levin (1999).
41. See Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).
42. One possible channel of contagion is that of trade links. During the 1990s, Chile forged close trade links with
several countries in Asia.
20The private  sector  quickly found ways  of  avoiding the  controls. The  most
common mechanism was misstating the purpose of the inflow, for instance, short-
term portfolio flows were often labeled as trade credit or as loans supporting a
direct foreign investment project.  To close the loophole, in July 1992, controls
were extended to trade credits and to loans related to direct foreign investment. In
1995, in an effort to close additional loopholes, the controls were extended to
Chilean stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange and to international  bond
issues.
The chronology of the controls in Brazil points in the same direction: over time investors
find the way of circumventing controls. Garcia and Valpassos make the point very clearly:
In 1993,  the government started a gradual process of reducing the participation of
short-term capital inflows directed to fixed income securities.  Debentures were
the  alternative found by  the  market  to  circumvent the  regulation and  keep
investing in  fixed income  securities.  In  November, the National  Monetary
Council moved to close this loophole  by also forbidding  investment in debentures.
Investments through derivative markets were responsible for the new round in the
game between regulators and investment banks.  By December, the central bank
had  prohibited  a  broader  range  of  fixed-income-like  securities,  including
investment  strategies involving derivatives  that lead to predetermined returns. 43
While stories about investors finding ways to avoid capital controls and exploit arbitrage
opportunities are abundant, observers could still argue that controls were successful-at  least in
some countries (Brazil and Malaysia)-because  they did segment domestic markets, at least in
the short run.  These observers could also add that this was after all what monetary authorities
intended: stopping hot money.  However, when central banks refer to hot money, they refer not
merely to flows with maturity of less than two months. In fact, central banks have even targeted
capital flows with maturities of up to five years.  Thus it seems difficult to argue that controls
were  successful  because  they  limited  the  spillover  of  international  shocks  at  monthly
frequencies.
The evidence from money markets points in the same direction. Interestingly,  however,
money markets are not as well integrated as stock markets, with correlations averaging about
0.20 and in  some cases not even statistically different from zero.4  As with stock markets,
43. Garcia and Valpassos (1998, pp. 22-26).
44. Unfortunately,  the length of the data series does not allow us to examine comovements of interest rates in the
longer run.  Presumably, money markets are more closely integrated at  lower frequencies.  For example, the
reduction in interest rates in the  United States in the early  1990s triggered massive capital flows to emerging
21controls do not seem to enhance this insulation either. The exception is Malaysia during the
episode of controls on outflows that started on September 1, 1998. This time, controls allowed
Malaysia to implement a more autonomous monetary policy. Nonetheless we do not think that
this result constitutes categorical evidence that controls on outflows do work. If we extend our
episode of financial repression to include the episode of controls on outflows starting in August
1997, the ability of controls to insulate domestic money markets vanishes.
VI. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a new approach to examine the dynamics of international
integration of financial markets. This approach has helped us to evaluate whether controls on
capital flows persistently isolate domestic markets from international markets or whether the
insulation they provide is just ephemeral. We have examined the evidence using data from six
emerging economies during the 1990s.  Our results can be summarized  as follows:
First, as to the central issue of short- and long-run integration of these economies with
world-financial markets, markets seem to be more linked at longer horizons. Moreover, our
results suggest equity prices to be more internationally connected  than interest rates.
Second, with regard to the claim that capital controls insulate domestic markets from
global spillovers, we  find  little  evidence that  controls effectively  segment domestic  from
international  markets. When they do, the effects seem to be short lived.
Third, with regard to the insulation they provide, controls on outflows do not seem to
differ from controls on inflows. For example, controls on outflows in Venezuela during the 1994
crisis and the unremunerated reserve requirements in Chile and Colombia during the capital-
inflow episode seem to have shielded domestic markets at the most at very high frequencies.
Fourth, interestingly, the degree of overall financial sophistication does not seem to affect
our conclusions on the insulation provided by capital controls. It is true that more developed
financial markets, such as those in Brazil, are more closely linked to international markets than
markets starting in 1990 and lasting until 1996 (with a short-lived sharp decline in 1995 after the Mexican crisis).
See Frankel, Schmukler, and Serven herein for evidence on the transmission of interest fluctuations in the United
States to Latin American monetary  markets since the 1970s.
22those in Colombia and Venezuela, which are far more illiquid. But capital controls do not seem
to provide an extra cushion against international  spillovers even in these latter cases.
Although our results go a long way in evaluating the effectiveness of capital controls in
some of the most well-known and discussed episodes, there is still much research ahead. We
have limited our analysis to the experience of the 1  990s and have only examined the experiences
in a handful of countries. Interestingly, all the countries in our sample have an important  number
of firms trading in mature financial markets. This might explain the inability of controls to sever
the international integration of equity markets and suggests that to learn about the degree of
maneuvering of monetary authorities, we need to examine more exhaustively the many channels
through which financial markets might be connected. This possibility indicates that it could be
very fruitful to include a more comprehensive set of episodes encompassing a richer variety of
stages of financial development.
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Source: Authors'  calculations using  Bloomberg  data.
a. The indexes are in U.S. dollars.  December 31,  1994=100.Figure  2
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Source: Authors' calculations  using Bloomberg  data.
a. The indexes are in U.S. dollars.  December  31,  1994=100.Figure 3
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Source: Bloomberg.
a. Interest rates are in percent per day.Figure 4
Latin American Overnight Interest Rates'
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Source: Bloomberg and Central Bank of Chile.
a. Interest rates are in percent per day.Figure  5
Brazil:  Stock Market  Cycles'
Short-Run Cycle
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1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Amplitude of Cycles
Stock Market  Controls  No Controls
Short-Run  Medium-Run  Short-Run  Medium-Run
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  1  Booms  Crashes
Brazil  0.029  0.030  0.023  0.014  0.034  0.034  0.029  0.033
Latin Amcnca  0.020  0.020  _  0.029  0.030  0.024  0.025  _  0.020  0.023
Brazi/  Latin America  1.41  1.56  0.81  0.45  1.42  1.37  1.45  1.48
Source: Authors' calculations using  Bloomberg data.
a. The short- (medhum-) run cycle is afiltered  series using the band-pass  filter and includes  only fluctuations  with periodicity  between  18 and 30 (88 and  100) days.  In the top and middle pancls,  the upper  lines are the
cycles  for Braztl and lower lines are the cycles for the Latin American index (defined as all countries  in the region excluding  Brazil).  The amplitude  of the fluctuations in the filtered index (deviation from trend) for Brazil is
measured  on the left axis: that  for the Latin Anierican  index is measured  on the right axis.  The amplitude  of the booms (crashes)  is the difference from the peak (trough)  to the mean of the cycle,  which,  by construction,  is zero.
Before the series were filtered, all country stock market indexes were standarized to series with zero mean and unit variance.  The vertical  Ines  in the top and middle panels separatc the episodes  of capital  account restrictions
frotn the episodes of no capital  account restrictions.Figure  6
Chile:  Stock  Market  Cyclesa
Short-Run  Cycle
No Controls  Controls  No Controls
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1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Amplitude of Cycles
Stock  Market  Controls  No Controls
Short-Run  Medium-Run  Short-Run  Medium-Run
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booss  Crashes
Chile  0.017  0.017  0.015  0.014  0.030  0.029  0.023  0.021
LatinAmerica  0.019  0.019  0.017  0.017  0.030  0.028  0.026  0.024
Chile/  Latin  America  I  0.90  0.88  0.88  0.85  0.98  1.04  0.86  0.87
Sounre:  Anthrs  calculations  using  Bloomberg  data.
a. The short-  (medium-)  no  cycle is a filtered  series using  the bond-paos  filter and includs only fl.cioao-ns witi petiodixity  between 18  and 30 (9tt and 100)  days. In the top and middle
panels,  the upper lines  are the cycles  for  Chile and lower lines at  the cycles  for  the Latin American  index (defined  as  all coumtes in  the region cxcluding  Chile). The amplit.de of the
fluctuations  in the filtered  index (deviation  from tmnd) for Chile  is measueed  on the lefl axis: that for the Latin Aerican  inde it measured  on the right  axis. The amplitude  of the booms
(crashts) is the difference  from the peak (trough)  to the mean  of the cycle,  which by construction,  is z-er.  Bofore  the series were filtered,  alt county stock market indexes  were standaized to
series with  zons  mean and .nit  -arance.  The vertical  lines in the top amid  middle panels separate  the episodes of capital  accourf restictions from  the episodes of no capital  account  restictionsFigure  7
Colombia:  Stock Market  Cycles"
Short-Run  cycle
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1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Amplitude  of Cycles
Stock Market  Controls  No Controls
Short-Run  Medium-Run  Short-Run  Medium-Run
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes
Colombia  0.029  0.030  0.016  0.020  0.025  0.026  0.025  0.025
Latin America  0.018  0.017  0.029  0.030  0.026  0.027  0.020  0.022
Colombia/LatinArnerica  1.67  1.74  0.55  0.66  0.99  0.98  1.23  1.11
Source: Authors' calculations using Bloomberg data.
a. The short- (medium-) run cycle is a filtered series using the band-pass filter and includes only fluctuations with periodicity between IS and 30 (88 and 100) days.  In the top and middle panels, the upper
lines are the cycles for Colombia and lower lines are the cycles for the Latin American index (defined as all eosmnies in the region excluding Colombia).  The amplitude of the fluctuations In the filtered index
(deviation from trend) for Colombia is measured on the lef  axis: that for the Latin American index is measured on the right axis. The amplitude of the booms (crashes) is the difference from the peak (trough)
to the mean of the cycle, which,  by construction, is zero.  Before the series were filtered, all country stock market indexes  were standarized to series with zero  mean and unit variane.  The vertical  lines in the
top and middle panels separate the episodes of capital account restrictions  from the episodes of no capital account restrictions.Figure 8
Malaysia:  Stock Market  Cyclesa
Short-Run cycle
Controls  No Controls  Controls  No Controls
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1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Amplitude of Cycles
Stock Market  Controls  _  ______No  Controls
Short-Run  Medium-Run  Short-Run  Medium-Run
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes
Malaysia  0.022  0.023  0.015  0.016  0.021  0.021  0.015  0.014
Asia  0.010  0.009  0.022  0.023  0.014  0.014  0.011  _  0.011
Malaysia/Asia  2.17  2.44  0.65  0.71  1.48  1.49  1.35  1.30
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  I3loomberg  data.
a. The  short-  (medium-)  run cycle  is a filtered  series  using  the band-pass  filter and includes  only fluctuations  with periodicity  between  18  and 30 (R8  and 100)  days, In the top and middle panels,  the
upper  lines  are the cycles  for Malaysia  and lower  lines  are the cycles  for the Asian index  (defined  as all countries  in the region  excluding  Malaysia).  The amplitude  of the fluctuations  in the filtered
index  (deviation  from trend)  for Malaysia  is measured  on the left axis:  that for the Asian  index is measured  on the right axis. The  amplitude  of the booms  (crashes)  is  the difference  from the peak
(trough)  to the mean of  the cycle,  which,  by  construction,  is zero.  Before  the senies  were filtered,  all country  stock  market  indexes  were standarized  to series  with zero  mean and unit  variance. The
vertical  lines in the top  and middle  panels  separate  the episodes  of capital  account  restrictions  from the episodes  of no capital  account  restrictions.Figure 9
Thailand:  Stock Market  Cycles'
Short-Run Cycles
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1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Amplitude of Cycles
Stock Market  Controls  No Controls
Short-Run  Medium-Run  Short-Run  Medium-Run
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes
Thailand  0.023  0.022  0.020  0.019  0.024  0.023  0.017  0.017
Asia  0.017  0.017  0.023  0.022  0.011  0.012  0.014  0.015
Thailand/Asia  1.36  1.30  0.88  0.86  2.12  2.02  1.17  1.14
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  Bloomberg  data.
a. The  short- (medium-)  run cycle  is a filtered  series  using  the band-pass  f iter and includes  only fluctuations  with periodicity  between 18 and  30 (88 and 100)  days. In the top and  middle panels,
the upper lines  are the cycles for Thailand  and lower  lines are the cycles for the Asian index  (defined  as all countries  in the region  excluding  Thailand). The  amplitude  of the fluctuations  in the
filtered  index  (deviation  from trend)  for Thailand  is  measured  on the left axis:  that for the Asian index  is measured  on the right  axis. The amplitude  of the booms  (crashes)  is the difference  from the
peak (trough)  to the mean  of  the cycle, wich,  by  construction,  is  zero.  Before  the series  were filtered,  all country  stock  market indexes  were standarized  to seies with zero mean  and unit
variance. The  vertical  lines  in the top and  middle  panels  separate  the episodes  of  capital  account  restrictions  from  the episodes  of no capital  account  restrictions,Figure  10
Venezuela:  Stock  Market  Cycles'
Short-Run  Cycle
No Controls  Controls  No Controls
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1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Amplitude  of Cycles
Stock  Market  Controls  No Controls
Short-Run  Medium-Run  Short-Run  Medium-Run
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes
Venezuela  |  0.040  0.036  0.035  0.038  0.043  0.045  0.031  0.038
Latin America  0.020  0.019  0.040  0.036  0.021  0.023  0.027  0.026
Venezuela/LatinAmenca  1.98  1.86  0.87  1.05  2.00  1.92  1.12  1.48
Source: Authors calculations using Bloombcrg data.
a. The short- (medium-) non  cycle  is a filtered series using the band-pass filter and includes anly fluctuations with periodicity between 18 and 30 (89 and  100)  days.  In the top and middle
panels, the upper lines are the cycICs  for Venezuela and lower lines are the cycles for the Latin American index (defined as all countrics in the region excluding Vcnezuela).  The amplitude of the
fluchmaions  in the filtered index (deviation from trend) for Venezuela is measured on the left axis: that for the Latin America index is measured on the right axis  The amplitode of the booms
(crashes) is the difference from the peak (trough) to the mean of the cycle, which, by construction, is zero.  Before the series were filtercd, all country stock market indexes were srastdarized to
senes  with zno mean and unit vaiance.  The vertical lines in the top and middle panels separate the episodes of capital account restrictions from the episodes of no capital account resichtons.Figure  11
Brazil:  Interest  Rate  Cyclesa
Short-Run Cycle
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Medium-Run Cycle
Controls  No Contools  Controls
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1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Amplitude  of Cycles
Money  Market  Controls  No Controls
Short-Run  Medium-Run  Short-Run  Medium-Run
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes
Brazil  0.085  0.068  0.029  0.020  0.132  0.152  0.048  0.059
Latin America  0.027  0.031  0.017  0.017  0.030  0.030  0.012  0.013
Brazil/Latin  America  3.13  2.20  1.71  1.15  4.38  5.12  4.01  4.47
Source: Authors' calculations using  Bloomberg data.
a. The interest rates are adjusted  for the expected changes in the domestic  currency-U.S. dollar  exchange  rate.  The short- (medium-)  run cycle is a filtered  series using  the band-pass  filter and includes  only
fluctuations with periodicity  between  18 and 30 (88  and 100) days.  In the top and middle panels, the upper lines are the cycles for  Brazil and lower lines are the cycles  for the Latin American  index (defined  as
all countries  in the region excluding Brazil).  The amplitude of  the fluctuations in the filtered index (deviation  from trend) for Brazil is measured  on the left axis: that for the Latin America  index is measured  on
the right axis.  The amplitude  of the booms (crushes)  is the difference from the peak (trough) to the mean  of the cycle, which, by  construction,  is zero.  The vertical  lines in the top and middle panels  separate
the episodes  of capital account restrictions  from the episodes of no capital account  restrictions.Figure  12
Chile:  Interest  Rate  Cyclesa
Short-Run  Cycle
Controls  No Controls
0  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~2
-2
1996  1997  1998  1999
Medium-Run  Cycle
Controls  No Controls
O.  I  =012
0;  0.1
-0.
-0.2  -,-0.  1
1996  1997  1998  1999
Amplitude  of Cycles
Money Market  Controls  No  Controls
Short-Run  Medium-Run  Short-Run  Medium-Run
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes
Chile  0.042  0.042  0.010  0.010  0.044  0.046  0.021  0.017
Latin America  0.023  0.024  0.012  0.012  0.116  0.129  0.046  0.044
Chile / Latin America  1.78  1.76  0.83  0.85  0.38  0.36  0.45  0.39
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  Bloomberg  data.
a. The intercst  rates are adjusted for the expected  changes  in the domestic  currency-U.S.  dollar exchange  rate. Thc short- (medium-)  run cycle  is a filtered  series using the band-pass  filter and
includes  only fluctuations  with periodicity  between 18  and 30 (88 and lOO)  days. In  the top and middle panels,  the upper lines  arc the cycles for Chile  and lowerlines are the cycles for the Latin
American index  (defined as all countries  in the region excluding  Chile). The  amplitude  of the fluctuations  in the filtered index (deviation  from trend) for Chile is measured  on the left axis: that for the
latin  America  index is measiured  on the right axis. The amplitude  of the booms  (crashes) is the diflcrence  from the peak (trough)  to the mean of the cycle, which,  by construction,  is zero. The vertical
lines in the top  and middlc panels  separate  the episodes  of capital  account  restrictions  from the episodes  of no capital  account  restrictions.Figure  13
Colombia:  Interest  Rate  Cyclesa
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1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Amplitude  of Cycles
Money Market  Controls  No Controls
Short-Run  Medium-Run  Short-Run  Medium-Run
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes
Colombia  0.046  0.051  0.013  0.012  0.081  0.076  0.025  0.024
Latin America  0.029  0.028  0.005  0.006  0.063  0.067  0.023  0.021
Colombia/LatinAmerica  1.59  1.85  2.33  2.03  1.29  1.12  1.09  1.18
Source: Authors'  calculations  using  Bloombcrg  data.
a. The interest rates are adjusted for the expccted  changes in the domestic  currency-U.S.  dollar exchange  rate. The short- (medium-)  run cycle  is a filtered  series using the band-pass  filter and includes only
fluctuations  with periodicity  betwecn 18 and 30 (8t and 100) days. In the top and middle  panels, the upper  lines are the cycles for Colombia  and lower lines  are the cycles for the Latin  American index (defined as
all countries  in the region  excluding  Colombia). The  amplitude  of the fluctuations  in the filtered index (deviation  from trcnd) for Colombia  is measured  on the left  axis; that for the Latin  America  index is  measured
on the nght axis. The amplitude  of  the booms  (crashes)  is the difference  from the peak (trough)  to the mean  of the cycle, which,  by construction,  is zero. The vertical  lines in the top and middle panels separate  the
cpisodes of capital  account  restrictions  from the episodes of no capital  account  restrictions.Figure  14
Malaysia:  Interest  Rate  Cycles'
Short-Run  Cycle
Controls  No Controls  Controls
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1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999
Amplitude  of Cycles
Money Market  Controls  No Controls
Short-Run  Medium-Run  Short-Run  Medium-Run
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes
Malayisa  0.076  0.087  0.020  0.020  0.083  0.083  0.023  0.023
Asia  0.081  0.078  0.031  0.021  0.069  0.069  0.028  0.029
Malaysia / Asia  0.94  1.11  0.65  0.93  1.19  1.20  0.83  0.81
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using Bloomberg  data.
a. The interest rates are adjusted for the expected  changes in the domestic  cunency-U.S.  dollar exchange  rate. The short-  (medium-)  run cycle is a filtered series  using the band-pass  filter and
includes  only fluctuations  with periodicity  between 18  and 30  (88 and 100)  days. In the top  and middle  panels, the upper lines  are the cycles for Malaysia  and lower lines are the cycles  for the
Asian index (defined  as all countries  in the region  excluding  Malaysia). The  amplitude  of the fluctuations  in the filtcred index (deviation  from trend)  for Malaysia  is measured  on the left axis: that
for the Asian  index is measured  on the right axis. The  amplitude  of the booms  (crashes)  is  the ditTerence  from the peak (trough)  to the mean of the cycle,  which,  by construction,  is zero. The
vertical  lines in the top and middle panels  separate  the episodes  of capital  account  restrictions  from the episodes  of no capital  account  restrictions.Figure  15
Thailand:  Interest  Rate Cycles"
Short  Run  Cycle
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1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998
Amplitude  of Cycles
Money  Market  Controls  No Controls
Short-Run  Medium-Run  Short-Ron  Medium-Run
Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes  Booms  Crashes
Thailand  0.069  0.078  0.047  0.045  0.071  0.070  0.033  0.031
Asia  0.070  0.067  0.027  0.032  0.059  0.057  0.023  0.021
Thailattd/Asia  0.98  1.17  1.74  1.41  1.21  1.21  1.45  1.44
Source: Authors'  calculations using  Bloomberg  data.
a. The interest rates are adjusted  for the expected  changes in the domestic currency-U.S.  dollar  exchange rate.  The short- (medium-)  run cycle is a filtered series using  the band-pass  filter and
includes  only fluctuations w4ith  periodicity  between  18 and 30 (88  and 100) days.  In the top and middle panels, the upper lines are the cycles  for Thailand and lower  lines are the cycles  for the
Asian index (defincd  as all countries  is  the region excluding  Thailand).  The amplitude of  the fluctuations  in the filterd  indcx (deviation  from trend) for Thailand  is mcasured  on tho left axis: that
for the Asian  index is measured  on the right axis.  The amplitude  of the booms (crashes)  is the difference  from the peak (trough)  to the mean  of the cycle,  which,  by construction,  is zero.  The
vertical  lines in the top and middlc  panels separate the episodes of capital  account  restrictions  from the episodcs  of no capital  account  restrictions.Figure  16







1  21  41  61  81  101  1  21  41  61  81  101





1  21  41  61  81  101  1  21  41  61  81  101




1  21  41  61  Sl  101  1  21  41  61  81  101
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Source: Authors' calculations using Bloomberg data.
a. We have used the Baxter and King (1995) band-pass filter. This filter removes all cycles with a
periodicity higher than the indicated periodicity as well as the cycles with a periodicity minus twelve days.
The solid (dotted) line is the correlation coefficient during the episode of no capital account controls (capital
controls).Figure  17
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Periodicity (in days)
Source:  Authors' calculations  using Bloomberg  data.
a. We have  used the Baxter and King (1995)  band-pass filter.  This filter removes all cycles with a periodicity higher
than the indicated  periodicity  as well as the cycles with a periodicity minus twelve days. The solid (dotted)  line is
the correlation  coefficient  during the episode  of no capital account controls (capital  controls)  episodes.Table  I
Correlation  Coefficient  of Domestic  and Regional  Market  Indices'
P.riodilby  Bradz  Chike  Ceol,nb,t  Mlaeysil  Tho.4d  Vo,,ota-
Test  fTmf  of  T-s, of  T-t  of  Ti  of  Test of
(d.ys)  Ne  Controls  Coaols  telity  No Conlrols  Cowol  oq.Uy  No Controls  ControL  qsatOly  No Controls  Contrets  sqollY  Ne  Cenlrels  Coterlr  Oqoal9y  No Controls  Con,lros  eqofity
20  068  039  1.89-  0.63  0.49  0.73  0.08  0.11  -0.14  0.65  0.33  2.54-  0.48  0-44  0.10  041  0.25  1.09
(0.08)  (013)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.18)  (0.12)  (004)  (0.17)  (0,10)  (0.05)  (0.13)
30  0.s0  0.49  0.02  0.72  0.45  064  0.27  0.08  0.55  0.54  0.35  1.19  0.43  0.36  062  0.10  0.15  -0.16
(0.18)  (0.12)  (0.09)  (0.42)  (0.32)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.03)  (0.05)  (0.10)  (0.22)  (0.21)
40  0.66  0.46  0.63  0.56  0.58  -0.12  0.28  0.20  0.23  0.62  0.44  1.44  0.57  062  4.29  0.57  0.25  0.18
(0.29)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.17)  (0.35)  (0.07)  (0.04)  (0.12)  (012)  (0.14)  (1.71)  (020)
50  0.75  0.32  1.15  0.50  0.39  0.44  0.25  0.42  -1.63  080  0.39  4.46-  0.82  0.70  1.44  0.33  0.28  0.14
k0.09)  (0.36)  (0.17)  (020)  (0.10)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.09)  (0.02)  (0.08)  (0.31)  (0.17)
60  0.77  0.56  0.41  0.54  053  0.06  0.30  0.14  0.76  0.63  0.39  1.63  0.66  0.73  -0.26  0.30  0.31  -0.08
(0.10)  (0.52)  (0.14)  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (o.lo)  (024)  (0.04)  (0.13)  (0.16)
70  0.81  0.49  0.72  0.50  0.69  -1.04  0.32  -0.03  1.16  0.46  0.39  0.65  0.53  0.73  -2.25'  0.46  0.34  0.58
(0. 1)  (0.43)  (0.18)  (0.07)  (0.20)  (022)  (0.03)  (0.11)  (0.08)  (0.03)  (0.13)  (0.15)
80  0.84  0.53  1.14  0.58  0.71  -0.66  0.30  0.14  0.95  0.59  0.39  0.94  0.49  0.72  -1.31  0.41  0.37  0.23
(0.24)  (0.13)  (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.18)  (0 12)  (0.18)  (0.03)  (0.08)  (0.15)
100  0.83  o.70  0.45  0.63  0.65  -0.04  0.30  0.15  085  0.66  0.42  I.90-  0.57  0.71  -241-  0.23  0.42  -1.16
(0.20)  (0.21)  (0.14)  (0.33)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.05)  (0. 1)  (0.05)  (8.03)  (0.02)  (0.16)
120  0.83  0.72  0.65  0.68  0.74  -0.37  0.29  0.18  0.60  0.67  -0.48  1.39  0.66  0.69  -0.45  0.33  0.44  -0.71
(0.08)  (0.14)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (0.I1)  (0.15)  (0.00)  (0.14)  (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.16)
Numbetofobsersatioo  1475  1000  425  2075  tl50  1350  3150  750  4225  425  1587  309
Nubmer  of lgs  59  40  17  83  23  27  126  30  169  17  79  15
a. The correlation  coefficient  captures the colnovement between  the domestic  and regional filtered stock market indexes.  We have used the Baxter  and King (1999)  band-pass  filter.  This filterremoves  all cycles with a periodicity  higherthan  the indicated
periodicity as well as the cycles with a periodicity  minus twelve days.  Standard en-ors are in parentheses.  To correct  for serial correlation, the standard ernor are calculated  using VARHAC  estimation  from Den Haan and Levin (1994).  The test of equality is a t-
test of the null hypothesis that the correlation  in episodes of  capital account  controls is the same as that in episodes  of no controls.
* Equality of cornelation coefficients  in episodes of controls and episodes  of no controls is rejected at least at 5 percent significance  level.Table 2
Correlation Coefficient  of Domestic and Regional Overnight Interest Rates'
Periodidily  Brazil  Chile  Colornbia  Malaysia  Thailand
Test ts  Test of  Test of  Test of  Test of
(days)  No Controls  Controls  equality  No Contr-ls  Controls  equality  No Controts  Controls  equality  No Controls  Controls  equality  No Controls  Controls  equality
20  0.04  0.07  -. 16  034  020  0.66  018  0.23  -0.21  0.74  0.13  6.61  0.72  0.39  1.78
(0.09)  (0.20)  (0.19)  (0.09)  (0.18)  (0.19)  (0.04)  (0.00)  (0.13)  (0.13)
30  0.04  0.11  -0.41  0.19  0.11  0.30  0.04  -1.15  0.36  0.48  -0.01  2.40  0.48  0.53  -0.47
(0 15)  (0.05)  (0.14)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.11)  (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.07)  (0.09)
40  0.00  0.10  -0.50  0.19  0.06  0.58  0.17  0.22  -0.17  0.76  0.01  3.37-  0.53  0.41  0.71
(0.10)  (0.17)  (0.13)  (0.18)  (0.31)  (0.09)  (0.20)  (0.  10)  (0.04)  (0.15)
50  0.00  0.20  -1.01  0.18  0.15  0.19  0.20  0.22  -0.06  0.75  0.00  3.19'  0.47  0.40  0.38
(0.11)  (0.16)  (0.13)  (0.16)  (0.32)  (0.12)  (0.20)  (0.12)  (0.08)  (0.16)
60  0.00  0.22  -1.29  0.17  0.17  -0.02  0.20  0.19  0.04  0.78  -0.01  3.62-  0.48  0.40  (1.39
(0.13)  (0.I1)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.29)  (0.10)  (0.16)  (0.15)  (0.15)  (0.16)
70  0.00  0.22  -1.36  0.16  0.18  -0.18  0.20  0.18  0.09  09  0.02  2.89'  0.75  0.39  0.92
((1.13)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.28)  (0.10)  (0.24)  (0.14)  (0.37)  (0.15)
80  0.01  0.22  -1.42  0.15  0.19  -0.33  0.19  0.16  0.11  0.79  -0.02  4.14'  0.86  0.38  1.45
(0.12)  (0.09)  (0.08)  (0.o0)  (0.26)  (0.o0)  (0.12)  (0.15)  (0.31)  (0.13)
100  0.01  0.22  -1.65  0.13  0.19  -0.52  0.17  0.14  0.10  0.78  -0.03  3.98'  0.88  0.36  1.64
(0.09)  (0.09)  (0.06)  (0.09)  (0.24)  (0.10)  (0.13)  (0.15)  (0.29)  (0.12)
120  0.02  0.22  -1.66  0.12  0.18  -0.5  0.13  0.12  0.03  0.77  -0.04  4.44-  0.87  0.35  1.80
(0.09)  (0.08)  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.44)  (0.08)  (0. 0)  (0.15)  (0.27)  (1.11)
Number of observation  558  892  363  849  606  743  1149  605  1615  557
Numberoflags  17  27  11  26  18  23  35  18  50  17
a. The correlation  coefficient  captures  the comovement  between  the domestic  and regional  filtered  interest rates (adjusted  for the expected  changes in the domestic  currency  - U.S. dollar  exchange  rate).  We have used  the Baxter  and King
(1999)  band-pass  filter,  This  filter removes all  cycles  with a periodicity  higher than the  indicated  periodicity  as  well as the cycles  with a petiodicity  minus twelve  days.  Standard  errors  are in parentheses.  I o correct  for serial correlation,  the
standard  error are calculated  using  VARHAC  estimation  from Den  Haas  and Levin  (1994).  l1he test of equality  is at-test  of the null hypothesis  that  the correlation  in episodes  of capital  account  controls  is the same as that  in episodes  of no
controls.
'Equality  of correlation  coefficients  in episodes  of controls and episodes  of no  controls  is rejected  at least  at 5 percent  significance  level.Policy  Research Working  Paper Series
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